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Factors Underlying Long-Term Trends: Output
OUR previous analysis has led us through an examination of the
secular trends in capital formation, in output, and in the capital-
product ratio. Distinctive patterns, it was observed, characterize
each. It should be recalled, however, that investment in the regulated
industries constitutes the principal interest of this study, and it is
only insofar as this central core is thereby illumined, that the trends
in the other variables have warranted attention. That all three
variables—capital formation, output, and the capital-product ratio
—are related in a complex system of mutual interaction, common to
most objects of economic study,is obvious. Yet in an analysis
confined to secular trends in particular industries, it is possible to
simplify. The trend in capital formation may be viewed, in the main,
as the net result of the factors underlying the trend in output on the
one hand, and those underlying the trend in the capital-product
ratio on the other. This is a hypothesis on which we shall amplify
later. It may be summarized in the equation:
O LCLC
where 0 stands for output, C for the stock of reproducible capital,
and t for time measured in some convenient unit.
The equation is of course a truism. It serves here, however, as a
frame of reference convenient for assembling the host of events and
conditions which together have influenced the pace of investment
in the regulated industries. We shall be concerned in this chapter
with one compartment of this framework—those factors which have
affected the secular trend of output.
In our previous discussion of output, one outstanding characteristic
observed was the secular tendency for its percentage rate of increase to
diminish over time. The decline set in at a very early date—in every
component and in the total for regulated industries as a whole.
Another characteristic concerns the absolute rate of change in
production. We noted the tendency of the regulated industries to
follow a path marked by at least one or more of the following stages:
Stage Output Change in Output
Increases by increasing amounts Increases by increasing amounts
H Increases by increasing amounts Increases by decreasing amounts
us Increases by decreasing amounts Decreases by increasing amounts
but remains positive
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Stage Output Change in Output
iv Decreases by increasing amounts Becomes negative and decreases
by decreasing amounts
V Decreasesby decreasing amounts Increases by increasing amounts
but remains negative
vi Decreases by decreasing amounts Increases by decreasing amounts,
until it reaches zero remaining negativeuntilit
reaches zero
The aggregate of all regulated industries, it will be recalled,
remained in stage i throughout the 1880—1950 span for which data
are available. So did three of the components—electric light and
power, telephones, and the all other group. The steam railroads and
local bus lines, on the other hand, had by 1950 progressed to stage in.
Thus, for these components the peak of output increments had been
passed, and total production was advancing by diminishing amounts.
Street and electric railways had progressed to stage v, with pro-
duction moving secularly downward at a pace which had finally
begun to level off.
This pattern of relative as well as absolute changes in production
is not confined to the regulated industries. Previous studies have
established that itis common to the growth of output in most
industrial segments of the economy,' though progress beyond stage in
is rare in the United States. We may inquire now concerning the
factors which combined to determine this behavior in the regulated
industries.
The Vacuum Effect
The uppermost limit to the growth of a new industry is set, by the
size of its principal market—in the case of most regulated industries,
the size and the purchasing power of the national population. In
none of our components would it have been technologically or
financially possible for the first productive units to satisfy fully the
ultimate demands of the then existing population. Typically, there
was—and perforce had to be—an experimental period, in which the
beginnings made were modest in the extreme. In this category were
the first railroad line, operated with thirteen miles of track by the
Baltimore and Ohio in 1830; the first electric company, with a
distribution area of less than a mile, in New York City; and the first
telephone exchange, with twenty-one subscribers, in New Haven.
In this experimental period the commercial feasibility of the
productive process, as well as the receptivity of consumers, was tried.
1CfSimon Kuzncts, Secular Movements in Production and Prices (Houghton Mifflin, 1930),
and Arthur F. Burns, Production Trends in the United States since 1870 (National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1934).
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As both tests were passed, innovators were free to expand and
imitators were inspired to activity. Each year brought larger, more
ambitious productive units, and elicited them in greater number
over an ever-widening circle. Given this modest start and the
subsequent tendency toward cumulative expansion, which in the
earliest days even business depressions fail to retard, spectacular
rates of increase in output were virtually inevitable. The data of
Table 17 start at or close to the beginnings of electric light and
power, telephones, and local bus lines. They show percentage rates
of increase for these components ranging from 7 to 15 per cent per
year during the first two decades of operation. Of course under these
circumstances, too, growth at least for a time in the manner of
stage i above acquired a high degree of probability.
But there were other factors which helped to generate this swift
advance. The market potentialitself grew progressively. The
population of the United States prior to World War I expanded by
increasing amounts, and even in subsequent years has grown sub-
stantially. Per capita incomes increased steadily. The point at which
decreasing returns might have retarded the growth of output was
continuously raised to higher levels, and was so raised throughout
much of the eighty-year time span covered by this study. In the
absence of a check, it was to be expected that output would rise
with the spectacular vigor evidenced by the data for all components
in the earlier decades covered by Table 17.
Nor does this exhaust the list of stimulating factors which operated
in the earlier days of the regulated industries. The first essays in a
new productive process are typically crude, and the possibilities for
improving efficiency are correspondingly manifold. Such improve-
ments, reducing costs and increasing sales, further stimulated output.
Combined with this was the gradual extenuation of consumer
resistance. For before general acceptance is accorded, each new
product must surmount a threshold of habit and inertia. And along
with these factors was the conflict with, and the final victories—
total or limited—over, competing products. Thus the success of the
early railroads overcame the opposition of wagon and stagecoach
operators, water carriers, and canal enterprises.
Hence theequilibrium point—at which production might
stabilize—was, at the beginning, far above the capacity of the first
tentative units established. And before it was even approached, a
host of factors operated to raise this point rapidly and progressively
to higher levels, each new obstacle overcome disclosing a wider
range of profit opportunities. Meanwhile, the report of these
opportunities was communicated over more extensive geographical
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and financial ranges. Stated alternatively, in their beginnings the
regulated industries were ones in which the marginal efficiency of
capital was much higher than the rate of interest or the prospective
rates of return in most other lines, and they were generally in a
position to have their situation widely publicized. The response of
the economy may be likened to the rush of air into a vacuum.
Brief mention may be made of the role of financing—a topic
treated more fully in Chapter 7—in shaping this stage in the pattern
of development. The vacuum effect is symbolic of the rush of
resources into a pocket of the economy in which the prospective
returns are unusually high. How swiftly it moves depends in part on
how quickly capital is mobilized for its use. In this respect, the
regulated industries enjoyed a distinct advantage. For the individual
firm in this segment of the economy is by nature large, endowed with
high prestige, and some degree of monopoly, along with an apparent
promise of substantial profit and relatively small risk. Hence capital
in larger amounts and over a greater area was made available with
less reservation than would have been true of the average industry
in the United States. It was a factor which lent additional power to
the vacuum effect in the regulated industries. This is not to say that
raising all the capital desired was at no point a difficulty for any of
the regulated industries—e.g. the railroads. It obviously was an
obstacle at a number of stages in their development. It must be
recalled, however, that their requirements were huge. The only
point made here is that the requirements were satisfied more easily
because of the special characteristics of the regulated industries, than
they would have been otherwise.
Output and JTationa1 Aggregates: The Vigorous Industries
Quantitatively, the vacuum effect may be defined as an advance
in production substantially in excess of the long-run growth of an
industry's potential market. It is characterized by an initial rush
which gradually subsides—slowly or swiftly petering out, depending
upon the relative strength of retarding or stimulating factors in an
industry's history. But that it must diminish in intensity rather
quickly, at least in some degree, is clearly evident from the data of
Table 22.
For example, in 1896 electric light and power output represented
0.07 per cent of the gross national product. By 1906 this percentage
had grown to 0.28, despite the fact that the national aggregate had
itself expanded substantially. Now if the advance of this component
had continued at the same percentage rate in subsequent years as
had prevailed in the decade prior to 1906, its output would have
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amounted to more than 80 per cent of the gross national product
by 1950. Even if we allow for the fact, previously pointed out, that
electric output is measured on a "gross" basis,2 this extrapolation
is obviously far beyond the realm of practical possibility. Nor does
this conclusion apply only to electric power. Study of the rates of
growth prevailing in the earlier years in any of our components would
yield roughly similar results. Note that this includes railroads and
street and electric railways, even though in these components the full
strength of the vacuum effect had been appreciably attenuated by the
earliest years for which data are available. In every case rates of growth
had been established which could not possibly have been sustained.
Yet in some of our components the pace of expansion remained
remarkably high throughout the period of study. These are the ones
which, throughout this period, were in stage i of the model pattern.
They are grouped in Table 22. Their output is compared in this
tabulation with the progress of population, income, and urbanization.
For these factors set limits of a kind to the development of nearly any
industry, though—depending upon other factors—they may be far
from definite. Of course, the phenomena described above—under
the vacuum effect—explain the fact that in the earlier years the
growth of production in the regulated industries far outstripped that
of population and of income too. But for the components in Table 22
the continued rise in output, relative to the national aggregates,
went far beyond this. That it persisted over so long a period—indeed
through the entire span of study—can only be explained by the
development of especially favorable circumstances. One factor or
another served over the years to sustain demand for the output of
these vigorously growing components, relativeto the national
income. Chief among these factors appear to have been:
1. The development of new uses for the product. This almost
always involved technological advance, as embodied, for example,
in the electric dishwasher, the vacuum cleaner, and other appliances.
It often involved, also, continued victories over competition, as
illustrated by the displacement of gas stoves and iceboxes by electric
models.
2. Virtual immunity to competition. This was the case for tele-
phones, for which no reasonably close substitute has been developed.
Accordingly, the industry was free to expand unimpeded, as its
service was transformed from a luxury item to an everyday household
necessity.
3. Technological innovations and economies of mass production,
permitting a secular decline in price relative to the price level in








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































general. This was an influential factor in both telephones and electric
light and power. It obviously encouraged the expansion of con-
sumption in relation to that of the national income.
4. A favorable shift in consumer tastes. We use the term "tastes"
here in the objective sense of the propensity to purchase in a given
environment of income and price structure. Tastes, in this sense,
may be altered by other changes in the environment, including
urbanization, advertising, mode of employment, and other influences
in great number. The growing complexity of modern life has,
through this channel, promoted the use of both telephones and
electric power. Swift and frequent communication, via the telephone,
and abundant illumination are attributes especially of city life. Hence
progressive urbanization powerfully raised the level of demand in both
cases. So did the revolutionary changes during the last seventy-five
years in the commercial and industrial configuration of the country.
The gradual movement of wives from housework to industry and
professional• careers is an additional example of a social change
stimulating the use of electric power—in this case, through accelerated
adoption of household electric appliances.
All of these factors in combination account for the continued gains,
over the entire 1880—1950 period, of output of telephone service and
electric light and power relative to population and income, as
measured by the data of Table 22. In addition, the development of
new industries help to explain the similar results shown for the all
other group and for all regulated industries in the aggregate.
Figured on a per capita basis, production actually rose by increasing
amounts over the seventy-year span in each of the vigorously
growing groups. Production of allregulated industriesinthe
aggregate advanced from $26 per person in 1890 to $69 in 1910,
to $94 in 1930, and to $191 in 1950. The general pace of the rise is
of similar order for telephones, electric light and power, and the all
other group. It should be borne in mind that the cyclical influence
in the data of Table 22 have been partially smoothed by the use of
nine-year averages.
The movement of the national income over time, of course,
reflects the advance in population and the steady ascension of per
capita incomes in combination. The gains in output of the vigorously
growing industries, relative to this aggregate, are therefore somewhat
less spectacular than when population was considered alone, though
they are very substantial still, as Table 22 shows. Production of all
regulated industries amounted to 7 per cent of the gross national
product in 1890, to 12 per cent in 1910, to 14 per cent in 1930, and
to 17 per cent in 1950. There is some suggestion here that the pace
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of the relative advance—though still quite large—was leveling off.
Similar evidence is apparent in the behavior of the separate industry
groups. In telephone service, where this tendency was most pro-
nounced, output accounted for 0.8 per cent of the gross national
product in 1910, 1.3 per cent in 1930, and 1.6 per cent in 1950.
In no case, however, is there doubt concerning the persistence of
the relative gains, secularly, throughout the entire period.
Though our interest is primarily in the trends evidenced by these
figures, attention may be called once again to the nature of our
output data. They are gross figures, in the sense described earlier,3
and hence tend to overstate the importance of our components
relative to national income. The degree of overstatement is generally
about one-third: that is, if calculated on a "net" basis, fully com-
parable to the income data, output of the regulated industries would
have amounted to about 12 per cent of the gross national product
in 1950 rather than the 17.5 per cent shown. But this matter does
not affect the relative trends of these series, in which our interest now
centers.
Reference has already been made to the influence of urbanization
on the demand for the products of the regulated industries. This
consideration leads to the calculation of another tentative ascending
"limiting" factor—the data shown in Table 23. This series represents
the product of the urban population and the per capita income of
the total population in each period. It is somewhat less than the
true figure for urban income, since per capita incomes in cities (for
which no figures are available over the period of interest) were
higher and probably rose somewhat more than did per capita
incomes in the nation as a whole. The difference in the aggregate,
however, would not be great,4 and our series in any event retains the
advantage of representing in combination the shift to cities super-
imposed upon the growth of population and the rise in per capita
incomes. Does the expansion of our vigorously growing components
outstrip this even higher and more swiftly rising "ceiling"? For all
regulated industries in the aggregate, the answer must be in the
negative. In the proportion of their output to urban population
income, there is but little evidence of a secular trend over the last
thirty-five years, as the relevant data in Table 22 show. From the
period of World War I, and perhaps from some years earlier,
through 1950, this percentage has remained roughly stable. But the
result reflects, in part, the downward pull of retarded and declining
See Chapter 4, section on The Data.
Particularly because the urban population was important in the total throughout
the period and since 1910 has been in the majority.
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TABLE 23
Nine-Year Averages of Urban Population Income
(billions of 1929 dollars)
Central Tear
















Figures are nine-year averages of net national product per capita of total population,
multiplied by urban population. Net national product is from revised annual data of
Simon Kuznets, National Bureau of Economic Research (Variant I); total and urban
population, from Bureau of the Census, with intercensal years interpolated.
aBasedon data for 1950 only.
industries included in the total. For when attention is centered upon
the vigorously growing components, it will be seen from Table 22
that they pierce this higher ceiling too.
Output of electric light and power amounted to 0.9 per cent of
urban population income in 1910, to somewhat more than 4 per cent
in 1930, and to nearly 8 per cent in 1950. Output of telephone
service grew from about 2 per cent of urban population income in
1910 to 2.7 per cent in 1930, and to 3.0 per cent in 1950. The all
other group, with an influx of new industries, also advanced pro-
gressively. However, the pace of this relative increase in output of
electric light and power, and in even greater degree, of telephones,
clearly leveled off in later years. The comparatively modest gains in
percentage over the last decade or two was by a wide margin
smaller than those which had been scored before; It is clear that in
the rising population, in the shift to cities, and in the advance in per
capita incomes, we have in combination the rincipa1 factors under-.
lying the continued powerful upward surge in output by these
components in recent years..
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But these are not the only factors. Nor do these influences in any
event operate in isolation from those other specific considerations
described earlier. The development of new uses, the favorable swing
of consumer tastes, the price-reducing inventions, and continued
success against actual or potential competition, would in some part
have been necessary of production in these components even to keep
pace with the sharp rise in urban population income. That the
advance in output was still greater throughout the 1880—1950
period is a tribute to their power.
It would appear reasonably clear, too, that the somewhat poorer
performance of telephones, when compared with electric light and
power, may be explained in terms of the relative force of such
attendant circumstances. Thus, new product uses have obviously
proved more influential in the latter component than in the former.
It is possible, also, that telecommunication has approached the
point of market saturation; that is to say, its use has been spread,
approximately, as widely as possible within the existing market, and
further expansion is dependent more directly upon over-all national
growth. The aggregate income elasticity of demand for telephone
service, for this reason, may have begun to diminish more rapidly,
though it may still remain above the critical level of unity. Surely
this is a natural development, ultimately, for a commodity which has
reached the stage of mass distribution, unless fully counteracted by
the gestation of new uses and the evolution of favorable environ-
mental circumstances affecting tastes. It is a development which
would stem from the limits of the average family budgetary income
itself as well as from the "law" of diminishing utility. And it is a
hypothesis which is consistent with the behavior of the relevant data
in Table 22. But this raises the question of retarding influences,
which are by definition barely evident in the vigorously growing
industries. We turn now to a discussion of their nature and their
effect upon the other components.
Retarding Influences
One important factor making for a subseqient retardation of
growth is the very force of the vacuum effect. As observed above, it
established in the regulated industries a rate of expansion that could
not possibly be maintained. Some diminution was inevitable. Thus,
in the 1890's and 1900's, the secular rate of increase in the gross
national product was about 5 or 6 per cent per annum.5 The yearly
Simon Kuznets, Long-Term Changes in the J'falional Income of the United Stales of America
since 1870 (Preliminary manuscript of Part I, National Bureau of Economic Research),
pp. 28—32.
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increase in production during the same period in electric light and
power was nearly 20 per cent. In telephone service, output rose by
more than 20 per cent per year. Even in street railways, where the
full power of the vacuum effect had appreciably subsided, the rate
of growth achieved in this period was nearly 10 per cent per year,
and in railroads about 7 per cent. In the post-World War I period,
when the growth of the national product was materially slower than
in previous years, output in local bus lines rose by about 7 or 8 per
cent per year. All these rates of growth declined substantially later
on. But in the especially favored industries, the rate remained well
above that of the national income even in the most recent decades
for which our record was prepared. By 1950, when the secular rate
of increase in the gross national product was about 2 or 3 per cent,
electric output was still headed upward at a rate approaching 8
per cent per year. Telephone service was expanding by about 7 per
cent per year. In other components (except for the all other group),
growth had declined close to, or below, the expansion rate of the
gross national product. This difference in behavior reflects the more
forceful impact in the latter components of the particular retarding
influences to which we now turn briefly.
One of these is the tendency for income elasticities of demand to
decline, once a product ceases to be a luxury and achieves mass
distribution, and once older competition has been thoroughly routed
or subdued. The power of this tendency is especially great in indus-
tries which by their nature lack resiliency—in lines in which the
development of new uses is not feasible, and quality upgrading is
narrowly limited. Another retarding factor is the rise of new and
effective competition of related goods and services. Unless counter-
acted, it is nearly certain to enter the scene, sooner or later, wherever
technological and institutional conditions permit.Itseffectis
obviously to cut, or to limit the growth of, the industry's market. It
intensifies the decline in the income elasticity of demand, or stimu-
lates its reduction if not already under way. And in extreme cases it
relieves the industry of its market entirely.
Both of these retarding factors are evident even in our vigorously
growing components, although in these cases their influence has been
over-shadowed by others. Some reduction in the income elasticity of
demand for telephone service seems apparent in the secular trend of
this component's output relative to the national income, as observed
above. But thus far it has been moderate. In electric light and power,
the competition of government projects has assumed increasing
significance. Publicly owned facilities accounted for less than 3 per
cent of the nation's total generating capacity in 1920, and for fully
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16 per cent thirty years later.6 But in these industries, there were
counterpoising factors stimulating growth, as pointed out in the
previous section. A similar degree of resiliency (as in electric light
and power) or virtual immunity to competition (as in telephones)
did not prevail in the other components.
Thus the rise of motor vehicles and air transportation have
materially limited the growth of railroad freight and passenger
business. Bus service and automobiles dampened the growth of, and
then reduced drastically the business of street and electric railways.
In local bus service, with the continued rise in levels of living and
the expanding ownership of passenger automobiles, there is evidence
that the income elasticity of demand has declined to less than one.7
Railroads and local bus lines had by 1950 progressed to stage in of
the model pattern; their production continued to increase, though
at a rate which was diminishing. Street railways ran almost the gamut
of the model pattern of development, and by 1950 was in stage v.
It is not without significance that once retardation appeared in
these industries, it persisted, or was intensified. There are a nuznber
of reasons why a retardation in the secular rate of growth, once
established, is seldom reversed. If a decline in the income elasticity
of demand has set in, it is most unlikely thatit can be turned back—
though it may be slowed. A "rich man's good" does not become a
"poor man's good" and then a rich man's good again; and, secularly,
per capita incomes in the United States have moved progressively
upward. If the industry's looming difficulties have stemmed from
successful competition, this too wiil most likely prove to be a self-
perpetuating, dilating obstacle to continued growth. For inter-
industry competitive advantages ordinarily inhere in the nature of
the industries and their products. They are not easily obliterated and
reversed. The advantages of the automobile over the railroad (say
the flexibility of its routes) and of the airplane over the auto (say its
speed) are indelible, technical characteristics of the vehicles con-
cerned. Their economic effects endure accordingly.
True, the pressure of competition may be steady rather than over-
whelming, gentle rather than devastasting, and the decline in the
income elasticity of demand over time may be slight. If so, there
may be no apparent limit to the duration of stage in of the model
pattern—the position of railroads and local bus lines in 1950. But on
the other hand, the inroads of competition may be swift and com-
prehensive. Then progress from stages tsr to iv and onward will be
relatively quick and certain, with production plunging. This was the
fate of street railways.
6SeeAppendix D, Table 32. See pages 90 and 92.
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Combined with these factors is the observation that the pace of
favorable technical changes slackens as an industry matures. This
may be due, as described in an illuminating essay by Kuznets,8 to
the fact that the flood of early technological and organizational
advances gradually leaves less and less in the productive process
subject to further improvement. Moreover, as Kuznets points out,
the gains accruing from additional innovations tend in the long run
to peter out, for as the price of a product is reduced, its price elas-
ticity of demand may be expected, ultimately, to decline.
Output and J'fational Aggregates: Retarded and
Declining Industries
To summarize, railroads, Street railways, and local bus lines
clearly lack the relative immunity to competition with which tele-
phones have been favored. They lack the numerous facets for new
uses characteristic of electric light and power. To only a limited
extent have they been able to produce services over a range of grades
sufficient to counterbalance the tendency toward a declining income
elasticity of demand. Though cost-reducing innovations have been
steady—especially in railroads,but also in local bus lines and
streetcars—they have not been sufficiently profound and persistent
to permit substantial and continued price reductions relative to the
general price level.
True, all of these components have been favored by the growth of
the nation at large—a common supporting influence for all industry.
They have also benefited, particularly, from the growth of cities.
But in their earlier years—in every case—output advanced at a rate
which far outstripped these general sustaining factors. Given the
retarding influences which gradually dominated these components,
it was a rate which was bound to diminish by large amounts in
subsequent decades.
Railroad output amounted to less than 5 per cent of the gross
national product in the 1880's and to about 16 per cent of urban
population income,9 as Table 24 shows. Thirty years later these
proportions had been stepped up to 9 per cent and 21 per cent,
respectively. It should be borne in mind that railroads had their
beginnings in the 1830's. It is testimony to the size of their market,
as well as to the magnitude of the construction job faced, that so
large a differential rate of growth could have persisted after nearly
8SimonKuznets, Economic Change: Selected Essays in Business Cycles, National Income,
and Economic Growth (Norton, 1953), Chapter 9.
°Sincethe output figures were not computed on the same basis as the national income,
the comparisons given in this section overstate the relative importance of the regulated










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































eighty years. This was a period, of course, in which expansion
thrived, at least in part, at the expense of older industries, as pre-
viously described. But once these had been definitely downed, given
the characteristics cited above, reduction in the proportion of this
component's output to national income was clearly in the offing.
The way was open for the more dramatic manifestations of retarding
factors.
Streetcars, too, had established a rate of growth in their early days,
that exceeded the pace of the general sustaining influences upon
which it must in the long run be dependent. Indeed, the differential
rate of growth in this case was even greater, though it should be
borne in mind that with the establishment of the first successful
electrified streetcar system in 1887 there arose a virtually new indus-
try, while the railroads at this time were roughly fifty years old. In
the 1890's the output of the street railway component represented
0.7 per cent of the gross national product, and in just twenty years
this ratio had nearly doubled. Its proportion of the swiftly growing
urban population income in the same period rose from 2 to 3 per
cent. Underlying this advance was a speculative splurge which
reached almost every city, large or small, in the country. It is
virtually certain that some modification of this differential rate of
increase would have occurred, given this industry's characteristics,
even if competition had not entered the scene. There is some evidence
of this in the gradual tendency toward stability in the ratio of street
railway output to urban population income, even before bus lines
and other motor vehicles had become an important element.
The vacuum effect displays its typical power also in the case of
local bus lines. In a mere ten years the proportion of its output to the
gross national product had advanced from 0.13 per cent in the
1920's to 0.22 per cent in the 1930's, and the proportion to urban
income in the same period from 0.26 to 0.45 per cent.
Thus, in all three cases initial rates of advance had been established
which seemed destined for later reduction. The effects of competition,
and other retarding factors, insured and intensified a radical change
in trend. For street railways, of course, this was a sharp and drastic
decline—sharp in relation to urban income and to national income
as well as to the population. By 1950 production by this component
amounted to 0.2 per cent of the gross national product, less than
one-sixth of the percentage prevailing at the peak. For railroads the
rate of increase dropped from one which far exceeded that of the
gross national product to one which appeared to match roughly the
growth of population, if we ignore the abnormal bulge in the period
of World War II and make due allowance for cyclical swings. In
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1950 railroad output amounted to about 56 dollars per person,
about the same as thirty years earlier.
The picture is somewhat distorted for local bus lines—particularly
in the light of the brevity of historical experience in this case—by
behavior in the war years. For in this period use of bus service was
greatly augmented by the prevailing limitations on the use of
passenger automobiles. The decline in the ratio of the production of
this component to the national income from the 1940's to 1950,
therefore, must be in some part discounted. Even so, it will be noted
that this ratio in 1950 was only slightly more than that prevailing in
the mid-l930's—a difference which contrasts signficantly with the
very sharp advances prevailing in earlier years. There seems little
doubt that the income elasticity of demand for local bus service had
declined materially between these periods, as pointed out in the
preceding sedion. And judging from behavior in post-World War II
years, there is the suggestion that it may have fallen below unity. If
so, unless some new element is introduced in this situation, future
increases in national income will bring less than proportional
advances in the output of the local bus component.'° In this respect,
then, it will more closely resemble the behavior of the other industries
treated in this section.
10Whethersomething new is on the horizon is not easily determined. The parking
and traffic problem in many large cities has thrown many car owners back on bus
service, and as this problem worsens bus service will continue to profit. But at the
same time there is a trend toward the two- or even three-car family, a factor which
reduces the use of buses for many local purposes.
Furthermore, the growth in popularity of the small car, arid the geographical dis-
persion of industry too, help to alleviate the parking problem.
92